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This Essay explores the enforceability and presence of pro-seller contract
terms in internet retail contracts.  Analyzing case law on internet contract
enforceability and a survey of 500 firms’ websites, it demonstrates that even
the enforceability of many internet contracts is questionable.  It then presents
new data that suggest that the prevalence of pro-seller contract terms is far
less than usually assumed.  It suggests that the benefit of making these terms
enforceable is outweighed by the loss of user friendliness required for the neces-
sary interface changes.  Finally, it uses fresh statistical analyses to determine
what relationship, if any, exists between enforceability, pro-seller contract
terms, business size, product channel, or product type.  Generally, it con-
cludes that the contract literature has likely overestimated the benefit of the
pro-seller contract terms and underestimated the role internet contract terms
play in informal enforcement; unenforceable terms may still serve as guide-
posts to dispute resolution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars have noted for decades the possibility that standard form
contracts disadvantage consumers.1  For many years, contract literature
focused on the idea that sellers with market power draft contracts that are
disadvantageous to consumers.2  Law and economics scholars, however,
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1. E.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 632 (1943) (arguing that standardized contracts allow
manufacturers to dictate contractual terms to consumers); Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as
Thing, 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131, 140–41 (1970) (claiming that process of contract
negotiation “tended to lessen the possibility of monolithic one-sidedness”); Arthur Alan
Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349, 350–51 (1970) (arguing that market does not adequately protect
consumer from standardized contracts due to monopolies, information asymmetry, and
consumer apathy); Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business
Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1051,
1059–60 (1966) (noting that standardized contracts allow firms to avoid liability for
representations from their sales agents, even in situations where consumer believes agent’s
representations to be binding); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion:  An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1225–29 (1983) (stating that standardized contracts
shift risks to consumers).
2. E.g., Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1333,
1333 (1982) (claiming that form contracts usually allocate most risks and burdens to
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have been skeptical about that hypothesis, pointing out that a strategy of
dictating pro-seller contract terms would rarely be the optimal technique
for exploiting market power.3  In recent years, however, the debate has
shifted as new product distribution channels have changed the technol-
ogy of contracting.  The new concern is that the internet distribution
channel allows firms, even those firms without market power, to exploit
the cognitive failures of their customers through the “shrouding” of
terms and similar techniques.4
That concern has become more prominent with the rise of internet
retailing, which extensively uses electronic standard-form contracts.5
This often undermines the notion of assent on which the contract para-
digm traditionally depends.6  Scholars have worried that internet retailers
are able to use their websites to draft one-sided contract terms and then
obscure them within the website interface so that customers will continue
to shop at their sites.7  This ability to obscure terms within their websites
consumer); Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1234 (arguing that form contracts impose risks and R
responsibilities on consumers that might outweigh benefits of lower prices).
3. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 827, 833–34 (2006) (arguing that firms will
“dependably treat consumers much better than their contracts require them to do”); Alan
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms:  The
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387, 1414–15 (1983)
(asserting that firms will generally supply level of warranty that consumers desire).
4. See Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self-Control:
Theory and Evidence, 119 Q.J. Econ. 353, 393–94 (2004) (predicting that firms exploit
consumer naiveté regarding contract renewal); Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded
Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121
Q.J. Econ. 505, 505–08 (2006) (predicting that firms will rationally hide information from
consumers).
5. See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem:  The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1105, 1114–15 (2006) (arguing that firms will retain
ambiguous language so long as they can predict how courts will interpret it); Clayton P.
Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 Hous. L. Rev. 975, 980–82
(2005) (arguing that “market correctives are insufficient to constrain sellers’ tendencies to
exploit buyers” through contracts of adhesion); Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an
Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 679, 687–89 [hereinafter Gillette, Rolling Contracts]
(arguing that it is unlikely that internet consumers will read electronic contracts more
closely than traditional consumers read written contracts).
6. E.g., Douglas G. Baird, Boilerplate and Market Power:  The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104
Mich. L. Rev. 933, 935–36 (2006) (discussing problems with relying on assumption of arms-
length negotiation); Gillette, Rolling Contracts, supra note 5, at 687–89 (arguing that R
“sellers systematically take advantage of their position to draft terms to which informed
buyers would object”); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 478–86 (2002) (discussing
rational, social, and cognitive factors that place consumers at risk from standardized
internet contracts); Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 899,
901–05 (2006) (describing problems with assent, readability, fragmentation, and range of
choice in standardized contracts).
7. See Stephen E. Friedman, Text and Circumstance:  Warranty Disclaimers in a
World of Rolling Contracts, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 677, 712–14 (2004) (arguing that consumers
should be protected from hidden disclaimers by allowing enforcement “unless the
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may make them more effective at hiding pro-seller contract terms than
their bricks-and-mortar counterparts.  This, among other concerns,8 has
led many to argue for a new contracting regime that deals with electronic
contracting.9  Indeed, because software is often distributed online, this is
a major topic in the ALI’s current project, Principles of the Law of
Software Contracts.10
Generally, this critical scholarly literature reflects an implicit syllo-
gism:  Aggressive contract drafting exploits consumer frailties and thus
leads to higher profits for retailers.11  We reject that approach, offering in
its place a new and simpler paradigm for understanding electronic con-
tracting.  Our central points are:  first, that there is a substantial cost to
making contracts enforceable and relatively little benefit to making them
one-sided; and, second, that for most retailers the costs of making con-
tracts enforceable exceed the benefits.  To put it more directly, we sug-
gest that retailers design websites to balance the benefits of extracting
purposeful assent with the burdens of complicating the purchase
process.12
circumstances indicate otherwise,” with circumstances to “include anything . . . that puts
the buyer off guard”); see also Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site
Terms of Use Agreements, 26 Hamline L. Rev. 499, 547–52 (2003) (questioning use of
terms of use, introduced as part of e-commerce industry).
8. See David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form
Contracts:  Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and
Anticompetitive Effects, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 983, 1005–08 (2006) (discussing how complex
boilerplate may be used strategically for industry collusion, higher consumer prices,
increased barriers to entry, and consumer segmentation); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra
note 6, at 433–34 (addressing arguments made by lawmakers and academics about R
adopting new set of rules to deal with electronic contracts); Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in
Electronic Contracting:  Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 Hous. L.
Rev. 1041, 1071–73 (2005) (outlining set of mandatory rules that would ensure fairness in
electronic contracts).
9. See, e.g., Gillette, Rolling Contracts, supra note 5, at 712–22 (suggesting judicial or R
regulatory intervention to internalize buyers’ interests); Robert A. Hillman, Online
Boilerplate:  Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104
Mich. L. Rev. 837, 855–56 (2006) (finding that mandatory website disclosure of terms may
be best strategy); Oakley, supra note 8, at 1100–01 (discussing favorably efforts to require R
minimum standards for electronic contracts); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers,
and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind. L.J. 1125, 1125–27 (2000) (discussing problems with
viewing online contracts through “traditional picture of how binding commitment is
arrived at”).
10. Principles of the Law of Software Contracts § 2, at 121 (Discussion Draft 2007)
[hereinafter ALI Principles] (introducing still incomplete section on standard form
agreements).
11. The corollary is that merchants that fail to design contracts that exploit consumer
frailties will be unable to compete with those that do, and thus will be driven from the
market.  Cf. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373, 1376, 1434 (2004)
(“[I]ssuers have to exploit consumers’ imperfect rationality in order to survive in [the
credit card] market.”).
12. There is an extensive academic literature, relying heavily on “clickstream data,”
analyzing the strategies for designing website interfaces so as to maximize positive
consumer response.  See, e.g., Steven Bellman et al., Designing Marketplaces of the
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We illustrate this new paradigm with the results of a survey of the
contracts of the 500 largest internet retailers.  This survey shows that
fewer than ten percent of these retailers have sales processes that create
enforceable contracts on their sites and that relatively few of the contracts
include terms thought to be detrimental to consumers.13  Whatever the
problems might be with those contracts and their enforcement (and
there are some), the terms that the retailers select as worth the trouble of
formal enforcement against their customers are relatively benign.14
Our discussion proceeds in three steps.  We start with a discussion of
two background topics:  the role of documents in retail contracting and
the legal framework for making internet retail contracts enforceable.
Second, we describe the empirical results, illustrating the rarity with
which internet retail contracts are enforceable or contain harsh terms.
Artificial with Consumers in Mind:  Four Approaches to Understanding Consumer
Behavior in Electronic Environments, J. Interactive Marketing, Winter 2006, at 21, 29
(noting effect of sorting on price sensitivity); Randolph E. Bucklin et al., Choice and the
Internet:  From Clickstream to Research Stream, 13 Marketing Letters 245, 252 (2002)
(comparing internet choice as captured by clickstream data to supermarket choice as
captured by UPC scanner data); Alan L. Montgomery et al., Modeling Online Browsing
and Path Analysis Using Clickstream Data, 23 Marketing Sci. 579, 590–93 (2004) (using
clickstream data to analyze paths through websites that are more and less likely to result in
purchases); Lan Xia & D. Suharshan, Effects of Interruptions on Consumer Online
Decision Processes, 12 J. Consumer Psych. 265, 278–79 (2002) (providing guidance on
limited negative impact of “interruptions” in online purchasing process).
13. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler’s papers have analyzed whether the timing of terms
disclosure or market conditions affect the one-sidedness of electronic contracts.  See
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buyers?
Evidence from Software License Agreements 24–25 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Law, Law & Econ.
Research Series, Working Paper No. 05-10, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
799282 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that terms disclosed before sale are
usually more pro-seller than terms disclosed only after sale); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler,
Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts:  An Empirical Analysis of
Software License Agreements 33–34 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Law, Law & Econ. Research Series,
Working Paper No. 05-11, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=799274 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (analyzing competitive forces in shaping standard terms).
Besides looking at a broader set of internet merchants, our project has a different purpose.
Rather than trying to assess whether pro-seller terms are associated with delayed
presentation or competitive conditions, we try to explain why firms seek to obtain consent
to their contracts.
14. The suggestion that the terms are “relatively” benign implies a baseline about the
normal level of adverse terms in consumer contracts.  We suggest that the terms are
relatively benign primarily because our baseline expectation was that almost all of the
contracts would include a large number of adverse terms.  Whatever the reasons for the
pattern here, it may not be unusual.  Ted Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller find a similar
pattern in the terms of arbitration clauses in agreements among large publicly-traded
companies.  See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration:
An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts
51–52 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-023, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927423 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[L]arge
corporate actors do not systematically embrace arbitration [despite reputed advantages].”).
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Third, we offer some statistical analyses to describe the small group of
cases in which merchants do choose to obtain assent to their contracts.
II. BACKGROUND
A brief preliminary discussion of the practical and legal context of
retail contracting provides a useful backdrop for the data and analysis we
present below.
A. The Practice of Retail Contracting
Although consumer transactions pervade everyday life, the actual
process of contracting remains largely unexamined.  Generally, contrac-
tual obligation in a retail transaction has three possible sources.  The first
is the actions of the parties in conducting the transaction—the retailer’s
offering of a product at a particular price, the consumer’s selection of the
product, and the consummation of a sale.  Under UCC Article 2, those
actions, even in the absence of any documentation, will lead to a contract
that incorporates the default terms of Article 2 to supplement the price
and quantity terms that are likely to be clear from the overt actions of the
parties.15
The second is any documents that the seller might provide the con-
sumer to clarify the seller’s obligations.  In most retail contexts, those are
likely to be quite simple, rarely extending beyond return policies, warran-
ties, and the like.  Although those documents are likely to be one-sided
boilerplate drafted by the seller, the enforceability of those documents
will rarely present important disputes, if only because they are likely to be
limited to dickered terms, affirmative commitments by the seller (war-
ranty and return provisions), or to disclaimers of warranties that UCC
Article 2 specifically validates.16
The third source is a separate contract with a remote manufacturer
that consumers are likely to see only when they have received the goods
and opened the packaging.17  Although reasonable minds could differ on
whether these so-called “shrinkwrap” contracts should be enforced, the
law has coalesced around a general acceptance of their enforceability.18
15. U.C.C. § 2-204, § 2-204 cmt. 3 (2000).
16. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-316 (describing how modifications to implied warranties of
merchantability for consumers “must be in a record, be conspicuous, and state ‘The seller
undertakes no responsibility for the quality of the goods except as otherwise provided in
this contract’”).  The validation of warranties in the UCC is subject to the provisions of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2000), which, generally
speaking, invalidate implied warranties in cases in which merchants provide express
warranties.  For a detailed discussion, see Daniel L. Keating, Sales:  A Systems Approach
166–80 (2d ed. 2003).
17. For an in-depth discussion of contracts with delayed presentation of terms, see
generally Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 743 (2002).
18. See id. at 752–56 (discussing different approaches that courts have taken in
dealing with delayed presentation of terms); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that arbitration provision shipped with computer was
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The shift from bricks-and-mortar retailer to online retailer does not
necessarily change the potential sources of contract obligation.  The cus-
tomer’s decision to place an item in a shopping cart and “click here to
buy” provides the electronic parallel to the retail purchasing decision.
The website often will have terms that govern its relationship with its cus-
tomers.  And manufacturers that distribute their products through in-
ternet retailers are just as able to provide shrinkwrap terms in the box as
they are when they distribute their products through catalog, mail-order,
or conventional retail outlets.  Our focus, as the introduction suggests, is
on the second of those sources:  the terms that a website provides to gov-
ern its relationship with its own customers.
B. Electronic Contracting
With respect to traditional contract doctrine, the shift to an online
contracting environment poses a particular challenge.  The statute of
frauds traditionally requires a writing to form a binding agreement involv-
ing a substantial sale of goods.19  To deal with an online electronic con-
tracting environment, the statute of frauds has been revised to permit
online retailers the same ability to enter into binding arrangements with
their customers that their bricks-and-mortar predecessors enjoyed.  To
that end, the central provisions of the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act (UETA) and of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act (E-SIGN) also require parity of treatment for electronic
records and paper documents.20
Those statutes say nothing, however, about the ritual through which
a retailer can ensure that it has obtained its customer’s binding assent to
a contract document.  In the language of UETA, “[t]he effect of an elec-
tronic record . . . is determined from the context and surrounding cir-
cumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption.”21  In a
face-to-face context, a concerned retailer will have little doubt that a for-
mal signing of a contract document will be adequate evidence of assent to
make the document binding against the consumer.  In the online con-
text, however, the youth of the internet and the continuing rapid devel-
binding on buyer); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding shrinkwrap license binding on buyer).  But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.
Supp. 2d 1332, 1341–42 (D. Kan. 2000) (denying application of arbitration clause
contained in form with standard terms packaged inside computer box); U.S. Surgical
Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1205–07 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding that single use
restriction on product package was not binding on buyer); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software
Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D. Ariz. 1993) (declaring license agreement shipped with
computer software was not binding on buyer).  For a forceful criticism of that analysis, see
generally James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 723,
750–51.
19. See U.C.C. § 2-201.
20. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act § 101, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7001; Unif. Elec. Transactions Act § 7, 7(A) U.L.A. 252 (2002).
21. Unif. Elec. Transactions Act § 9(b).
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opment of typical user interfaces make it much more difficult to be sure
precisely what type of transactional interface provides reliable evidence of
assent.
On that point, the prudent retailer would turn to the growing body
of case law, which at this point provides considerable guidance as to what
types of interfaces are—and are not—sufficiently robust to obtain reliable
assent from the retailer’s customers.  Although too simple in the real
world (and thus for the empirical analysis that we present below), it is
helpful to start by dividing website interfaces into two broad categories:
“clickwrap” and “browsewrap.”  There are numerous variations of the two
categories, and some conflicting decisions, but, in general, courts have
been willing to uphold clickwrap interfaces and have been less receptive
to browsewrap interfaces.
1. Clickwrap Cases. — For purposes of the statistical discussion in the
parts that follow, we treat clickwrap as including the following types of
interfaces:  terms within a frame through which a user must scroll to get
to a radio button that must be checked to proceed; terms within a frame
and a radio button outside and below that frame that must be checked to
proceed; and a statement that the purchase is subject to terms and condi-
tions, a link to those terms, and a radio button that must be checked to
proceed.  The first two forms of clickwrap have largely been accepted as
forcing assent to all the terms included in the contract.22  The last cate-
gory has also been held as giving the purchaser an “opportunity to review
the terms . . . by clicking on the hyperlink;”23 thus, these terms will likely
govern a transaction preceded by such a clickwrap.  There are some types
of interfaces that courts have not yet addressed, including sites with a pre-
checked radio button and those with a radio button and a link to the
terms that is browsewrapped (i.e., not adjacent to the statement).  Our
expectation is that courts would treat those interfaces as adequate, on the
theory that the consumer will have received adequate notice of the terms.
2. Browsewrap Cases. — There are numerous ways in which an inter-
face could be treated as browsewrap, but perhaps the defining aspect of
browsewrap is that the user need not take affirmative action regarding
the terms to complete the relevant transaction.  So, for example, the term
in its purest form includes an interface that presents a link at the bottom
of the page to the terms and conditions.  It also includes more ambiguous
situations, such as where there is a statement that the purchase is gov-
erned by terms that are linked to the page (but there is no affirmative
22. See ALI Principles, supra note 10, § 2.01 & illus. 4 (codifying rule); Juliet M. R
Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace:  Electronic
Contracting Cases 2005–2006, 62 Bus. Law. 195, 201–03 (2006) (describing legal
distinction between clickwrap and browsewrap).  Although discussing shrinkwrapped
terms, the same analysis of ProCD has been applied to clickwrap agreements online.
23. DeJohn v. The .TV Corp. Int’l, 245 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (C.D. Ill. 2003); see also
Treiber & Staub, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 474 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 2007)
(holding that UPS pages provided adequate notice and enforcing its clickwrap contract).
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requirement that the user click a radio button acknowledging the terms).
There are numerous variations between those two extremes, but the one
on which we have appellate judicial guidance is the initial end of the
spectrum—the pure browsewrap.
The seminal browsewrap case is Specht v. Netscape Communications
Corp., in which the court addressed whether browsewrapped terms gov-
erned a transaction online.24  The rule for enforcing terms in an online
contract was clearly stated in the case:  “[A] consumer’s clicking on a
download button does not communicate assent to contractual terms if
the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the
download button would signify assent to those terms . . . .”25  Although
this rule was applied in the context of downloading software,26 it has also
been used as the test to determine whether certain terms are included in
the sale of goods over the internet.27  Thus, the test asks whether the site
provides reasonable notice of the terms of the contract when making a
purchase online.28  The Specht court went on to find that a reasonably
prudent internet user would not necessarily scroll down to see the bottom
of the page where the terms and conditions were located.29 Specht, there-
fore, provides relatively clear guidance that browsewrap agreements (or
links to such agreements) that a consumer cannot see on the screen do
not force assent.
As Mark Lemley and others have noted, the distinction between
clickwrap and browsewrap has blurred in recent years, as lower courts
have suggested the possibility that browsewrap might be enforceable in
some contexts.30  In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., for example, the plain-
tiff (Verio) tried to use Specht as a way to avoid the enforcement of terms
24. 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002) (determining whether plaintiffs “agreed to be
bound by the software’s license terms . . . even though plaintiffs could not have learned of
the existence of those terms unless . . . they had scrolled down the webpage to a screen
located below”).
25. Id. at 29–30.
26. Id. at 20–21 (discussing facts of case—users downloading software provided
online).
27. See, e.g., Defontes v. Dell Computers Corp., No. PC 03-2636, 2004 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 32, at *17 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2004) (applying Specht rule to sale of computers
over internet).
28. Specht, 306 F.3d at 31 (“We are not persuaded that a reasonably prudent offeree in
these circumstances would have known of the existence of license terms.”).
29. Id. at 32 (holding that “a reference to the existence of license terms on a
submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of
those terms”).
30. See ALI Principles, supra note 10, § 2.01 cmt. b (discussing Ticketmaster Corp. v. R
Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH(VBKx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483, at *5–*10
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459, 472–75
(2006) (comparing browsewrap enforcement in business versus consumer transactions);
Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 22, at 201–03. R
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of which it had knowledge.31  Verio argued that the terms were only
browsewrap, with no forced assent or notice, because the terms appeared
only after it submitted a query (the equivalent of making a purchase) to
Register.com (the defendant).32  The court rejected Verio’s argument be-
cause Verio had made numerous queries, which put it on notice of the
terms of making queries such that later purchases would be subject to
those terms.33  This presents the first exception to the rule stated in
Specht—a contract can be enforceable even if there is not reasonable no-
tice:  “[W]hen a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and the
offeree makes a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of
the offer, the taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms . . . .”34
As this discussion of Register.com suggests, the lower court cases to
date do not provide any reliable template for designing an enforceable
browsewrap interface.  At most, these cases suggest that website terms can
bind a visitor when circumstances suggest that the visitor should have
been aware of the terms, typically because of repeated use of the site.35
This theory seems particularly attractive in cases that involve “screen
scraping”—a technique where one business goes to the website of an-
other business and collects data using an automated agent—where it is
fair to say that the visitor knows that the activity is unauthorized.36  It is
harder to see how that theory would apply to consumer transactions in-
volving a retail site, where the visitor might use the site dozens of times
without ever noticing the terms of use.37
In theory at least, a lawyer might decide to “take a chance” on the
enforceability of a browsewrap interface, particularly one of the better
forms—such as one with a pre-clicked radio button.  But the central point
31. 356 F.3d 393, 401–02 (2d. Cir. 2004) (“Verio contends that in no instance did it
receive legally enforceable notice of the conditions Register intended to impose . . . .
[But,] Verio admits it knew perfectly well what terms Register demanded.”).
32. Id. at 401.
33. Id. at 401–03.
34. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
35. The ALI Principles state:  “[B]rowsewrap may be acceptable, according to some
courts, when the transferee should have knowledge of the standard form from previous
visits to a site or based on reasonable notice.”  ALI Principles, supra note 10, § 2.01 cmt. b. R
The idea that the “knowability” of terms might be adequate to make them enforceable is
particularly important in the realm of open source licenses, where the knowability of the
terms of a license like the General Public License often will be the principal basis for
treating it as a binding contract.
36. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7654-HLH(VBKx), 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483, at *5–*10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (denying defendant’s motion for
summary judgment because there was sufficient evidence that defendant knew that its use
of automated agent violated plaintiff’s terms of use); Lemley, supra note 30, at 472–74 R
(describing Ticketmaster and other cases where courts upheld browsewrap terms against
defendant competitors who used automated agents).
37. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 476–77 (“One plausible reading of the cases is that R
courts in browsewrap cases show greater solicitude to consumers than to businesses, and
will enforce browsewraps primarily in business-to-business (b2b) rather than business-to-
consumer (b2c) transactions, and perhaps only in repeat transactions.”).
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for our purposes is clear:  A well-advised website designer would require
some affirmative action from the user, indicative of assent to the docu-
ment in question, in order to reliably produce a binding contract.  As the
draft of the ALI Principles of the Law of Software Contracts suggests, a
fair assessment of the cases is that a click-through interface is a “safe har-
bor” of enforceability beyond which websites stray at their own peril.38
We now turn to our data to consider the extent to which that problem
motivates retailers as they design their sites.
III. THE REALITY OF INTERNET RETAIL CONTRACTING
Determining what businesses do is not science; determining what e-
commerce businesses do is less than that.  E-commerce businesses are
continually changing as both the technology and the internet market-
place develop.  Defining one class of online sellers is elusive when web-
sites come and go, businesses offer new products and discontinue old
ones, and companies merge.  Here we take a static picture of a class of
online retailers and draw a dataset from that class.39  The dataset consists
of the top 500 internet retailers, determined by Internet Retailer as of
2005,40 together with information about the contracts that those retailers
use.
Part A explains the dataset.  The point was to collect three categories
of information about internet retail contracting:  facts about the busi-
nesses and their sites, the terms of the contracts that they use, and the
robustness of assent required by the interface on their websites.  Part B
introduces the study by describing the businesses in our dataset, which
present an unusually broad cross-section of retailers of various sizes and
trade lines.  Finally, Part C presents our two main findings:  Retailers have
rarely designed interfaces to obtain assent to their posted terms, and the
posted terms rarely include harsh pro-retailer terms.
A. Dataset
Our primary goal in assembling this dataset was to examine the rela-
tionship between a retailer’s business model and its contracting practices.
Thus, our analysis combines Internet Retailer survey data about the busi-
nesses and their websites with information about the terms of their con-
tracts and the contracting interfaces at each retailer’s site.41  The result-
ing dataset offers a unique opportunity to examine contracting practices
because it includes a cross-section of contracting terms and practices
38. See ALI Principles, supra note 10, § 2.01 cmt. c. R
39. Internet Retailer, Top 500 Guide:  Profiles and Statistics of America’s 500 Largest
Retail Web Sites Ranked by Annual Sales (2006) [hereinafter I500].
40. Id. at 6–18.
41. The terms of each retailer’s contracts and its website interface were collected and
coded by the authors.
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across numerous sectors, together with uniform business information
about those firms.
1. Business Information. — The information collected from Internet
Retailer falls into three general categories.  First, as evidence of the gen-
eral size and scope of the business and its site, is the business’s 2005 web
sales (in dollars), the number of monthly visits to the website, and the
number of unique monthly visitors.
Second, as evidence of market power, we calculated the business’s
market share within its principal merchandising market from Internet
Retailer and then used that information to calculate CR4 and Herfindahl-
Hirschman indices (HHI) for each of the fourteen principal merchandis-
ing markets into which Internet Retailer divides the dataset.42
Finally, we have a group of miscellaneous data points that relate to
the business models of the firms and the size of their websites:  conver-
sion rate (the percentage of shoppers that completed purchases), average
ticket (in dollars), total SKUs on the website,43 principal merchandising
market (allocating the businesses into fourteen categories), and mer-
chandising channel (which divides firms among consumer-branded man-
ufacturers, catalog/call center, retail chain, and virtual store).
2. Contracting Terms and Interfaces. — To determine the contracting
terms and interfaces of these retailers, we collected data from all of the
sites during the first quarter of 2006.  Specifically, we logged onto each
retailer’s home page,44 selected a product to purchase, and began the
purchase process.  Where necessary, we registered at the site.45  We con-
tinued through the purchase process to the point where we were reasona-
bly sure that we had completed an order.  We saved screen shots of the
home page and of each page that indicated a statement relating to con-
sent of terms.46
During the process, we also collected copies of all contract docu-
ments visible from pages that were visited during the purchase process.
Looking broadly for relevant documents, we collected not only “terms
and conditions” but also “FAQs” and return and privacy policies and dis-
42. CR4 is a measure of industry concentration.  We calculated CR4 as the percentage
share that the top four firms in each market held of the total sales of all firms in each
market.  HHI is a measure of the size of firms in relationship to their industry.  We
calculated the HHI as the sum of the squares of the percentage shares of all firms in each
market.
43. SKU stands for “stockkeeping unit,” which is a measure of how many distinct items
of merchandise a retailer sells.
44. If the home page was a page directing the user to multiple companies—a parent
company directing the user to its subsidiaries—one subsidiary was selected and we
determined both the terms and the type of assent from that one site.  See, e.g., I500, supra
note 39 (describing Federated Department Stores). R
45. If the sites required registration, we collected screen shots of the registration
process and all terms and conditions and statements of consent.
46. We did not collect screen shots of the product itself or of the product in a virtual
cart if these screens included neither terms nor consent interfaces.
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claimers.  Ultimately, we collected more than 1,200 documents from 500
sites.
After collecting the information, we coded it to extract two types of
information from each site.  First, we made a determination related to the
level of assent required, ordering assent along an eight-point continuum
drawn from the cases discussed above,47 as modified to reflect the actual
practices on the sites.48  The eight points of our continuum, from lowest
level of confidence in enforceability to highest level of confidence in en-
forceability, are as follows:
1)  Pure browsewrap, with no language on any of the order pages
that suggests agreement.
2)  Statement that a transaction involves consent to a document that
is neither displayed nor linked.
3)  Statement, not adjacent to the “place order” button, that a trans-
action involves consent to a specified document that is not displayed
but is linked.
4) Statement immediately adjacent to “place order” button that
transaction involves consent to a specified, linked document.
5)  Pre-checked radio button that acknowledges acceptance of terms
and conditions.
6)  Radio button that must be affirmatively checked to acknowledge
acceptance of terms and conditions.
7)  Scrolling through contract terms required before purchase, with
radio button.
8)  Documents pushed to user at time of entering site or when regis-
tering, with registration being a condition to entering the order
placement process.
Second, we reviewed the documents at the site.  A typical contract—
the most representative terminology styles it “Terms of Use”—contains
provisions that address site usage (e.g., regulation of online conduct,
scope of license, proprietary rights in content, third party proprietary
rights, security, privacy, and disclaimers), provisions that address
purchases (e.g., return policies, warranties, limitations of liability, and dis-
claimers), and provisions that relate to modification or enforcement of
contract terms (e.g., choice of law, choice of forum, and the like).  Our
review focused on the use of contracting terms that modify the default
rules of UCC Article 2 (or the Restatement, as the case may be) in ways
that appear to favor sellers.  We selected clauses based on their promi-
nence either in the literature about boilerplate or frequent appearance
in the contracts that we reviewed.  For lack of a better term, we refer to
these as “pro-seller” clauses.  The nine terms for which we collected data
are:
47. See supra Part II.
48. When a site had more than one document requiring consent, we assigned a
consent level based solely on the document with the most enforceable consent.
\\server05\productn\C\COL\108-4\COL405.txt unknown Seq: 13 30-APR-08 12:21
996 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 108:984
1)  Disclaimer of implied warranties.
2)  Limitation of the types of liability (typically consequential
damages).
3)  Limitation of the amount of liability (damage caps, typically at
the purchase price).
4)  Choice of law.
5)  Choice of forum (court).
6)  Choice of forum (arbitration).
7)  Class action waiver.
8)  Jury trial waiver.
9)  Contractual statute of limitations.
B. Describing the I500 Retailers
A preliminary description of our business variables is valuable for sev-
eral reasons.  First, they give a sense of the broad variety of firms involved
in internet retailing, the sectors in which internet retailing predominately
occurs, the size of the retailers, and the variation in size among the firms.
More importantly, these variables provide the context for understanding
our findings regarding their relatively benign use of terms and interfaces.
Table 1 provides a summary description of our data about the retailers.
TABLE 1:  SUMMARY OF BUSINESS VARIABLES
Monthly
Web sales Monthly unique Conversion Average Total
($M) visits (M) visitors (M) rate (%) ticket ($) SKUs (K)
Mean 138 2.8 1.5 3.46% 170 927
Median 22 0.79 0.50 2.5% 100 11,000
S.D. 540 7.9 3.3 3.5% 260 6,200
Skewness 9.8 8.7 6.7 3.7% 8.1 9.9
IQR49 51 1.7 1.1 2.1% 90 56
Number 500 500 475 490 492 311
Because our data start with the largest retailers and include all retail-
ers in the top 500, it should be no surprise that on most of the financial
variables our data are highly skewed, with a substantial drop-off in size
from the largest to the smallest retailers in our dataset.  Using web sales,
for example, the largest (Amazon.com) has annual sales of more than $8
billion dollars, while the smallest retailer in our dataset (Emitations.com)
has sales of only $3.2 million.  Indeed, in most cases there is a striking
drop-off after a small handful of very prominent retailers.  Table 2 shows
the five largest sites for each of the variables reported in Table 1.
In addition to the quantitative data about each firm and its website,
Internet Retailer also broke the firms down along two separate dimensions
related to the type of business.  First, Internet Retailer divides all of the
retailers into fourteen separate categories based on the retailer’s product
49. The IQR is the interquartile ratio, the share of the firms between the 25th and
75th percentile.
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TABLE 2:  TOP RETAILERS ON BUSINESS VARIABLES
Web sales Monthly visits Monthly unique Conversion Total SKUs
($M) (M) visitors (M) rate (%) Average ticket ($) (M)
1 Amazon Amazon (120) Amazon (43) Peapod (31%) BMI Gaming Abebooks
(8,500) (4,000) (80)
2 Office Apple (63) Wal-Mart (24) FreshDirect IBuyDigital.com Alibris (60)
Depot (29%) (1,600)
(3,800)
3 Staples Wal-Mart (42) Disney (21) Market Day iFloor.com (1,500) Biblio (30)
(3,800) (24%)
4 Dell Target (42) Apple (19) Magellan’s Skynet (1,500) CafePress.com
(3,780) (23%) (22)
5 HP Overstock.com Sears (18) NBTY (20%) SmoothFitness.com 1-800-
(2,830) (39) (1,400) Contacts (20)
market, as detailed in Table 3.  Those data are useful because they permit
us to explore the possibility that contracting practices might differ based
on the type of product the retailer sells.  Second, Internet Retailer divides
the merchants into four separate “merchandising channels” based on the
relationship between the website and the retailer’s offline operations.  In
general, these channels run along a spectrum ranging from virtual (no
bricks-and-mortar operations, like Amazon.com) to catalog/call center
(such as L.L.Bean) to branded manufacturer (such as Dell) to retail
chain (such as Office Depot).  Table 4 summarizes the breakdown of
merchants by merchandising channel.
TABLE 3:  PRODUCT MARKETS OF I500 RETAILERS
Volume M$/Store CR4
Market (M$) Percentage Number (Rank) (%) HHI
Mass Merchant/Dep’t
Store50 18,300 27% 27 678 (2) 72% 2570
Computers/Electronics 17,700 26% 54 328 (3) 64% 1270
Office Supplies 10,300 15% 11 936 (1) 99% 4550
Apparel/Accessories 7,060 10% 109 65 (8) 28% 350
Books/CDs/DVDs 2,500 3.6% 29 86 (5) 74% 1740
Housewares/Furnishings 2,410 3.5% 55 44 (9) 50% 1010
Specialty/Non-Apparel 2,330 3.4% 60 39 (13) 34% 470
Food/Drug 1,879 2.7% 26 72 (6) 57% 1190
Health/Beauty 1,750 2.5% 17 103 (4) 90% 3420
Sporting Goods 1,340 1.9% 39 36 (14) 52% 860
Flowers/Gifts 1,200 1.7% 18 67 (7) 75% 1870
Hardware/Home
Improvement 851 1.2% 22 39 (11) 87% 2230
Toys/Hobbies 741 1.1% 19 39 (12) 77% 3630
Jewelry 615 0.9% 14 43 (10) 73% 2070
TOTAL 68,900 100% 500 138 — —
50. If it seems odd that Table 2 reports Amazon.com as the largest merchant with
more than $8 billion in sales and Table 3 reports total sales for the book/CD/DVD sector
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TABLE 4:  MERCHANDISING CHANNELS OF I500 RETAILERS
Category Volume (B$) Percentage Number M$/Store (Rank)
Retail Chain 27.8 40% 143 194 (2)
Virtual 20.8 30% 225 92 (3)
Branded Manufacturer 10.5 15% 45 233 (1)
Catalog/Call Center 9.85 14% 87 11 (4)
TOTAL 68.9 100% 500 138
C. The Rarity of Binding Interfaces or Pro-Seller Contracts
Because our principal goal is to explore the contracting practices of
internet retailers, the business variables discussed above are important
primarily as background.  Turning to the contracting data, we confess
surprise at what we found in both the interfaces and in the contracts
themselves.
Our preliminary hypothesis, bolstered by casual experience purchas-
ing on the internet, was that the desire of internet retailers to maintain
high conversion rates would motivate many retailers to design interfaces
that did not obtain robust “click-through” assent from their customers.
Still, skeptical as we were before our data collection, we were startled to
find that barely 12% (61 of 500) of our dataset extract any form of con-
sent beyond pure browsewrap.  Indeed, dividing the dataset at the point
most likely to reflect the broadest reasonable estimate of legal enforce-
ability (the point at which the retailer presents a pre-checked radio but-
ton to reflect assent), fewer than 6% (28 of 500) of the retailers have
enforceable contracts on their websites.51  Table 5 summarizes the data
on that point.
TABLE 5:  DISTRIBUTION OF ASSENT
Form of assent52 Number Percent
Pure browsewrap 439 88.0%
Reference to document 9 1.8%
Reference to linked document 6 1.2%
Reference to linked document beside “order” button 18 3.6%
Pre-checked radio button 3 0.6%
Unchecked radio button 15 3.0%
Scrolling to radio button 6 1.2%
Registration 4 0.8%
TOTAL 500 100%
of only $2 billion, this is because Internet Retailer codes Amazon.com as a mass merchant/
department store.  See infra note 61 (discussing categories of sales by Amazon.com). R
51. Although we have not comprehensively examined the interfaces of non-U.S.
retailers, it is interesting that major sites like Amazon.com and Dell.com have substantially
different terms of use at their non-U.S. websites, but quite similar interfaces.
52. For a description of each of these forms of assent, see supra Part III.A.2.
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The data about the terms of the contracts are even less consistent
with our prior expectations.  Our working hypothesis was that the rarity
with which consumers read contracts presented to them on the internet
makes it almost costless for a retailer to include pro-seller terms in any
contract that the retailer drafts.  Thus, we expected, retailers would al-
most always include the kinds of pro-seller terms that are standard for
boilerplate contracts with consumers in other contexts.  We were sur-
prised to find that none of the nine clauses that we collected appeared in
more than half of the contracts.  Perhaps the most surprising finding is
that arbitration clauses appear in less than one-tenth of the contracts
(only 44 of 500 retailers).53  The failure of half of the sites to include
clauses disclaiming consequential damages and implied warranties is also
surprising,54 given the ever-present possibility that customers could sue
an internet retailer seeking to recover damages either from a data breach
at the site or from harms to their personal computer arising out of inter-
action with the site.55
TABLE 6:  FREQUENCY OF PRO-SELLER TERMS
Clause Number Percent
Disclaimer of Implied Warranties 245 49%
Limitation of Damage Types 243 49%
Choice of Law 201 40%
Choice of Forum 159 32%
Limitation of Damages (Caps) 108 22%
Arbitration 44 9%
Class Action Waiver 33 7%
Contractual Statute of Limitations 28 6%
Jury Trial Waiver 6 1%
In some ways, the data we present here speak with clarity.  Most obvi-
ously, they seem to go far toward resolving the concerns that have preoc-
cupied other writers:  that internet retailers are taking advantage of the
electronic interfaces the web permits to bind their customers to pro-seller
53. This is particularly surprising given the likelihood that arbitration will be the only
cost-effective method of resolving small-dollar disputes between internet merchants and
their customers.  See, e.g., Sayeedi v. Walser, 835 N.Y.S.2d 840, 848 (Civ. Ct. 2007)
(dismissing action by disgruntled eBay purchaser for want of personal jurisdiction over
eBay merchant), discussed in Mark Fass, Contact Held Insufficient to Sue Seller, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 6, 2007, at 1.  It also warrants comparison to the credit card context, where arbitration
agreements are standard for disputes that are much larger in size, and apparently often
have the effect of insulating the card issuer from judicial review of its actions.  See
generally Mann, supra note 6, at 915–32 (discussing various approaches to resolve credit R
card related disputes).
54. With respect to implied warranties, one possible explanation is that many of the
sites provide express warranties, and thus any disclaimer would violate the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (2000).
55. For comparative purposes, we note that such clauses are ubiquitous in contracts
with credit card issuers, where the issuers’ need for such clauses is considerably less clear.
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contracts.56  The fact is, at least for now, and at least at the largest retail-
ers, the contract terms and contracting interfaces of internet retailers are
surprisingly benign.
To return to the framework we suggest in the Introduction, retailers
should extract consent to pro-seller terms whenever the costs of an addi-
tionally complex interface are less than the benefits of the more favorable
terms.  Thus, to make sense of the data we must infer some combination
of relatively high costs of extracting consent and relatively low benefits of
pro-seller contracts.  More directly, if retailers act rationally, the costs of
the additional click must be substantial or many more retailers would be
making their contracts more favorable to themselves.  The converse pro-
position is more intriguing to the student of commercial transactions:
The benefits of these terms must be surprisingly slight or they would over-
come the costs of interface design much more often than they do.57
There is, to be sure, another side to the phenomenon.  Considering
the findings together it is natural to ask, for example, why a business
would bother to write a pro-seller contract if it is not going to make the
contract enforceable against its customers.  It reaps the bad publicity of
having a harsh attitude toward its customers but gains none of the bene-
fits of protection from legal liability.  We speculate that much of the an-
swer is that the benefits of enforceable contracts are relatively slight be-
cause many customers will abide by the terms of contracts even if they are
not enforceable.  In part this might be caused by a tendency to treat the
terms of agreements as reference points for fair resolution of disputes,
wholly apart from the anticipated outcomes of litigation.58  It also might
reflect the disparity in sophistication between the retailer and the cus-
tomer—so that a customer might readily abandon a dispute when con-
fronted by the retailer with terms from the website that purport to under-
mine the ability to pursue the claim through litigation.
If this analysis is correct, the mere possibility of disgruntled custom-
ers is not enough to justify the extra click that brings enforceability; the
internet retailer must have a concern that a substantial number of the
disgruntled customers will ignore the terms of sale posted on the website
and pursue litigation.  Absent that concern, there is little basis for making
the contract binding, though there is some basis for having the contract
include terms that limit the rights of the customer.  At the same time, to
56. See supra notes 7–9.
57. Retailers without click-through interfaces still might assume that their terms will
be enforceable.  As discussed above, supra Part II.B.2, they might be relying on recent cases
suggesting that they would have at least a chance of enforcing browsewrap terms against
their customers.  Our point, however, is that the transactional lawyer designing the website
would use a click-through interface to ensure enforceability if the value of enforceability
was substantial in relation to the cost of the additional click.
58. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points 39 (Nov. 14, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=944784 (suggesting that contracts “can continue to govern the parties’
feelings of entitlement”).
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the extent the purpose of the contract is to palliate disgruntled custom-
ers, there is good reason for the contract to be written in terms that will
sound reasonable to the typical consumer, which suggests that retailers
should include pro-seller clauses only in cases where they are likely to be
useful in the event of disputes.
This dynamic is clearest in the context of privacy policies.  The re-
tailer gains little or nothing from making a privacy policy binding, be-
cause the typical privacy policy consists solely of representations and com-
mitments by the retailer as to the collection, use, and protection of
information.  If the document includes no commitments on the part of
the customer, the only significance of making the document a binding
contract is that it allows customers to sue the retailer for breach of con-
tract.  Surprisingly enough, there is some authority for the proposition
that a retailer is not subject to suit by its customers even if it does violate
the terms of its privacy policy.59  Thus, in this context, a principal source
of exposure for violating a privacy policy is a complaint from the Federal
Trade Commission enforcing Section 5 of the FTC Act.60  Similarly, here
we might expect that enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission
eventually might become one of the principal methods of holding in-
ternet retailers to the terms they offer on their websites.
IV. EXPLAINING THE PUZZLE OF INTERNET CONTRACTING
Part III explained why businesses rarely will make contracts binding,
and why they often, though not always, will include pro-seller terms in
their contracts.  It did not, however, try to explain which businesses will
make their contracts binding or include pro-seller terms and why.  We
close in this Part with some preliminary analyses of those questions, in an
attempt to understand what distinguishes the retailers that do draft pro-
seller contracts or obtain consent to their contracts from those that do
not.
Initially, our working hypothesis was that the best place to look for
an explanation of variation in contracting practices was the characteris-
tics of the businesses in question.  For example, consider Dell and
Amazon as the two paradigmatic retailers at opposite ends of a spectrum
of contracting needs.  Dell has a clear need for a contract with robust
assent.  Dell’s products are complicated electronic devices that even for
the best of manufacturers will be defective from time to time.  Moreover,
59. See, e.g., In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 326–27
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding no claim for breach of privacy policy absent showing of economic
loss, but leaving open possibility of consumer protection claims in most contexts); In re
Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-CV-126, 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004)
(rejecting claim for breach of privacy policy because of failure to show sufficient detail to
make it a contract, reliance on it, or damages from its breach).
60. See Federal Trade Commission, Enforcing Privacy Promises:  Section 5 of the FTC
Act, at http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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in the cases in which they are defective, one would expect that consumers
often will suffer consequential damages of one kind or another (fire or
loss of data being the most obvious).  At the same time, because of the
cost and complexity of the average transaction, the cost in lost customers
of adding an additional screen to obtain robust consent seems slight.
Thus, it is no surprise that Dell has a robust contracting interface, in
which a customer signals affirmative assent by clicking to agree to a con-
tract that includes a disclaimer of implied warranties, a damage cap, a
limitation on consequential damages, a choice of law clause, arbitration
clause, and waiver of class actions.
Amazon lies at the other end of the spectrum.  It is difficult to imag-
ine how Amazon might have exposure to costly consumer litigation.  At
least with respect to its core business of selling books and music,61 its
products are unlikely to cause serious consequential damages.  Those
products are unlikely to fail to conform to any warranty that might ac-
company them unless the products are damaged, and Amazon (like many
bookstores) has a lenient return policy that makes serious disputes un-
likely.62  In sum, Amazon has relatively little to gain from an enforceable,
pro-seller contract.  To be sure, we note above that all internet retailers
have some justifiable concern about litigation arising out of the operation
of their sites (as opposed to the products that they sell), but that does not
undermine the point that Amazon’s core business generates less demand
for a pro-seller contract than that of many other internet retailers.
At the same time, Amazon—the owner of the renowned (and vili-
fied) “one-click” patent63—is the retailer most devoted to streamlined
purchases, and thus most likely to be harmed by extra “clicks” in its
purchase interface.64  Thus, it is no surprise that Amazon’s interface does
61. In 2005, about two-thirds of Amazon’s revenues ($5.9 billion out of $8.5 billion)
came from the sales of “media” products, as opposed to “electronics and other general
merchandise.”  2005 Amazon.com Annual Report 36, available at http://library.corporate-
ir.net/library/97/976/97664/items/193688/AMZN2005AnnualReport.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
62. The dominance of credit cards for internet payments makes it difficult to have an
onerous returns policy, given the ease with which customers can disavow claims through
the credit card system.  In recent years, however, some merchants have begun to scrutinize
those claims more aggressively, motivated by the perception of consumer abuse.  See
Michael Rubinkam, Online Sellers Getting Tough:  More Merchants Challenge Fraud and
Charge-Backs, Houston Chron., Apr. 17, 2006, at 4 (discussing returns policy of Ice.com,
I500 Retailer # 193).
63. See Martin Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, A Technical Critique of Fifty
Software Patents 2, 7 (Jan. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=650921) (discussing and rejecting criticisms
of one-click patent).
64. See, e.g., Lou Hirsh & Jennifer LeClaire, Kings of Repeat E-Business, E-Commerce
Times, Aug. 26, 2002, at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/19137.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Amazon’s early and effective use of personalization
technology at its site); Keith Regan, Amazon Dips Toe into Online Grocery Business, E-
Commerce Times, June 15, 2006, at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/51136.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing importance of “ultra-convenient
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not extract robust consent; it simply states that “[b]y placing your order,
you agree to Amazon.com’s privacy notice and conditions of use,” which
are available in small type links at the bottom of the page (links that are
not ordinarily visible at the same time as the quoted text).  At the same
time, the conditions of use include a number of pro-seller clauses:  a dis-
claimer of implied warranties, limitations on consequential damages,
choice of law, choice of forum, and arbitration clauses, and a waiver of
class actions.
Another complicating factor is the development of interfaces over
time, which suggests that the design of retailer contracts and interfaces is
subject to a significant learning curve.  Dell’s history provides the clearest
evidence, because four published judicial opinions addressing the pres-
ence of assent in online sales with Dell illuminate the development of its
interface from 2004 through early 2006.65  Although it is difficult to
clearly determine where Dell was on the consent continuum at any given
time without screen shots (which we only have as of the first quarter of
2006), the cases suggest that Dell went through the following progres-
sion:  beginning in 2004, Dell had a pure browsewrap;66 sometime in
2005, Dell switched to browsewrap with a statement that a purchase is
subject to terms and conditions (and possibly a link next to that state-
ment);67 and, in the first quarter of 2006, of which we have screen shots,
to a statement with a radio button that requires affirmatively clicking to
proceed and a link to the terms and conditions.68  The first two steps in
Dell’s progression are discussed in reported opinions;69 but there is not
[shopping] experience” to Amazon’s effort to enter online grocery business).  For
academic discussion of the importance of short purchase paths at websites, see
Montgomery et al., supra note 12. R
65. Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Hubbert v.
Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 118 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 127
P.3d 560, 563 (Okla. 2005); Defontes v. Dell Computers Corp., No. PC 03-2636, 2004 R.I.
Super. LEXIS 32, at *4 (Jan. 29, 2004).  There is a fifth case that deals with customer’s
assent, but the court only discusses the shrinkwrapped contract in reasoning that the
consumer had assented to the arbitration provision.  Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133,
139–40 (Me. 2005).
66. Defontes, 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32, at *4 (describing Dell’s websites as allowing
users to view terms of use “as a hyperlink on the bottom of Dell’s website”).
67. Hubbert, 835 N.E.2d at 118 (stating that following statement was present on three
of Dell’s order pages:  “ ‘All sales are subject to Dell’s Term[s] and Conditions of Sale’”).  It
is hard to determine exactly what website interface confronted the plaintiff in Provencher, as
the court simply stated:  “The Agreement was available for Mr. Provencher’s review on
Dell’s website before, while, and after he ordered the computer . . . .”  409 F. Supp. 2d at
1199.  This is even more difficult in Rogers where the court professed itself unable to
determine “whether the plaintiffs were required to consent to the ‘Terms and Conditions
of Sale.’”  127 P.3d at 563.
68. I500, supra note 39 (profiling Dell). R
69. Defontes discusses Dell’s site as a browsewrap agreement and uses a reasonable
notice standard.  2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32, at *17.  Both Rogers and Hubbert seem to view
Dell’s site as browsewrap with a statement referring to the Terms and Conditions; however,
each case uses different reasoning. Hubbert, 835 N.E.2d at 121–22 (reasoning based on
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yet a case discussing Dell’s current online purchasing process, which in-
cludes the robust click-through interface discussed above.
In light of the discussion of contracting rules in Part II, it is not sur-
prising that the cases discussing Dell’s earlier interfaces were not uni-
formly favorable.  Thus, in its 2004 decision in Defontes v. Dell Computer
Corp., the Superior Court of Rhode Island held that the arbitration clause
in Dell’s terms and conditions did not bind the plaintiff, reasoning that
the browsewrap “was not sufficient to put Plaintiffs on notice of the terms
and conditions of the sale of the computer.”70  One year later, the Illinois
Court of Appeals in Hubbert v. Dell Corp. faced a newly remodeled Dell
website, on which the terms were available through a hyperlink at the
bottom of the page and three order pages stated that “All sales are subject
to Dell’s Term[s] and Conditions of Sale.”71  The court held that this
statement was enough to put a reasonable person on notice of the terms
and thus make them binding against customers.72
Surely the weakest reasoning employed in this line of cases appears
in Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp.73  In Rogers, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
addressed the same issue as Hubbert and Defontes, but instead of resolving
the question of enforceability based on the objective and undisputed facts
about the interface, it saw this issue as a battle of the forms issue to be
determined by the facts of each case.74  Although it had as much evi-
dence as the other two courts that decided the issue, the court in Rogers
remanded the case for further fact finding to determine when exactly an
offer and acceptance occurred, what terms were included in the initial
contract, and if those online terms were included or offered as additional
terms.75  The unpredictability of the judicial response to its interface cer-
tainly gave Dell a notable incentive to adopt the more robust clickwrap
interface that it now uses.
Collectively, this anecdotal information gives some reason to despair
in trying to develop a conceptual model of contract interface design that
can be verified with quantitative data.  The line of cases involving Dell can
notice); Rogers, 127 P.3d at 566–68 (reasoning based on time of formation). Provencher
gives little indication of the status of Dell’s website and assumes the validity of the online
contract.  See 409 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.
70. 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32, at *17.
71. 835 N.E.2d at 121–22.
72. Id.  The ambiguity of the term “browsewrap” is evident from the discussion in the
ALI Principles, which regards situations like that found in Hubbert to be examples of
browsewrap despite the relatively plain notice and accessibility of the terms on the order
pages.  See ALI Principles, supra note 10, § 2.01 cmt. b.  In any event, for purposes of the R
coding in our dataset this would not have been treated as pure browsewrap.  Moreover, as
we discuss in the text, Dell’s subsequent experience in litigation apparently has convinced
the company that the decision in Hubbert is not sufficiently reliable to justify retaining the
interface at issue in that case.
73. 127 P.3d 560.
74. Id. at 568 (“Section 2-207 and other provisions of the U.C.C. apply to the contracts
here.”).
75. Id.
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cut in different ways.  As discussed above, the litigation illustrates why it is
important for Dell to have the interface that it now has.  But it also can be
read more critically:  Shouldn’t it have been obvious to Dell by the turn of
the century that it needed a robust contracting interface to protect itself
from claims by its customers?
Given those problems, we approach the statistical analysis with an
open mind about the possibility of multiple explanations for the con-
tracting practices we have found.  We start from the basic hypothesis that
the primary reason for having a robust contracting interface is to enforce
pro-seller contracting terms.  Accordingly, we organize our statistical anal-
ysis as an investigation of the data on that question.  Our strategy is to
start in the first section below with a simple model in which the existence
of pro-seller terms is the only variable that we use to explain variations in
the robustness of the contracting interface.  Subsequent sections will
gradually add other variables to explore the extent to which those vari-
ables improve the explanatory power of the model or detract from the
explanatory power of the clauses in the contract.
A. Clauses and Assent
To quantify the existence of pro-seller clauses, we use a binary varia-
ble (Pro-Seller Clauses? in Table A1) that indicates whether the contract
includes any of the nine pro-seller clauses that we coded.  Not surpris-
ingly, there is considerable overlap among the firms that have the se-
lected clauses.  Two hundred thirty-four of the firms have none of the
clauses.  Integrating that data point with Table 6 above suggests that
about 90% of the firms that have any pro-seller terms in their documents
have a disclaimer of implied warranties (245 of 266) and a limitation of
consequential damages (243 of 266).  Figure 1 illustrates the number of
clauses among the 266 firms that have any pro-seller clauses.  As that table
suggests, about half of those firms have either four or five of the nine
clauses; only three have more than seven of them.76
To quantify assent, we use an ordinal variable with values from 1 to 8
reflecting the level of assent (AssentLevel in Table A1).  Model 1 in Table
A1 reports the results of an ordinary least squares regression of that basic
model.  As the Table shows, the relationship between the existence of
pro-seller clauses and the robustness of the interface is significant at the
76. Although we are skeptical about the value to be gained by simply counting
onerous clauses, we did analyze the relation between the number of onerous clauses in a
firm’s contract and the level of assent.  There is a correlation coefficient of about 13%,
significant at the 1% level.  Given the discussion in Part II of reasons why a firm might
include those clauses and yet not obtain assent to its terms, it is not surprising that the
correlation is so low.  We also investigated the possibility that a single “super” clause was
important, estimating models that used each of the clauses as a separate independent
variable.  The results of that analysis were inconsistent, suggesting that some clauses might
have a positive relationship to assent and others a negative relationship.  Because the
coefficients on the clauses in those models were unstable with the addition of additional
control variables we do not report those results here.
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FIGURE 1: OVERLAP OF PRO-SELLER CLAUSES
BUSINESS VARIABLES
PRO-SELLER TERMS LEVEL OF ASSENT
0.1% level.  The magnitude of the coefficient (.528) indicates that firms
with clauses tend to have an interface that is about one-half level more
robust than firms without such clauses in their contracts.77
That relationship is reassuring, because it suggests that rational fac-
tors are driving the contracting practices of firms, but it is still the case
that the great majority of each type of pro-seller clause appears in con-
tracts that are not presented in an interface that would reliably make the
contracts enforceable against customers.  Accordingly, it would be far too
simple to say that firms adopt robust interfaces because their business
needs have driven them to include pro-seller clauses in their contracts.
The subsequent sections explore the extent to which more complete
models buttress the reliability of that analysis.
B. Business Variables and Pro-seller Clauses
As the discussion at the beginning of this Part indicates, many fea-
tures of a business will affect the robustness of the interface a firm selects
for its websites.  Some of those variables are likely to affect the need for
particular contractual protections (and thus affect the interface only indi-
rectly), while others are likely to affect the benefits and burdens of a ro-
bust interface indirectly.  Because the purpose of this project is to under-
stand the extent to which the selection of the interface is driven by the
business need for pro-seller clauses, our strategy is to assess the extent to
77. Although we do not report them here, we also estimated a parallel set of models
using logistic regressions with a binary dependent variable cutting the dataset after the first
four categories of assent, at the point (a pre-checked radio button) that approximates the
boundary of legal enforceability.  The results indicated a similar pattern of relationships,
although the levels of statistical significance were often lower.  We do not report those
models here because of our view that the line between enforceable and unenforceable is
not clear in practice.  Thus, we believe the model more accurately reflects the motivations
of online businesses when it treats each step as reflecting both a marginal increase in the
likelihood of enforceability and a marginal increase in the transaction costs of contracting
at the site.
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which inclusion of those other variables in the model undermines the
explanatory power of the clauses variable with which we began.
Our data permit us to explore several possibilities about the relation-
ship between the business model of the firm and its contracting interface.
Four general variables seem important.  First, if we assume that the value
of assent correlates with the price of the good sold, then we should ex-
pect firms to seek robust assent more often when they sell expensive ob-
jects.  If this is true, then average ticket (the average price per order) at
the site should relate to the robustness of the interface.
Second, if the total number of products sold reflects the likelihood
that the firm sells products for which legal protections might be impor-
tant, then the variety of products (measured in our dataset by the Total
SKUs at the site) might relate to the robustness of assent either directly or
indirectly through the need for protective clauses.
Third, different types of sites involve greater concerns about the
complexity of the interface.  As Table 2 shows, for example, online gro-
cers experience unusually high conversion rates, which suggests that it
would be less problematic for them to use a more robust interface than it
is for other merchants.  As the discussion of Dell’s litigation history sug-
gests, other merchants with lower conversion rates will struggle with the
technological difficulty of designing a well-crafted interface that extracts
consent without unduly distracting customers.78
Fourth, we expect a difference between wholly “virtual” firms and
those that are adjuncts to bricks-and-mortar firms.  The idea is that retail-
ers that start with a website are likely to investigate the value of a robust
interface as a standalone question, while retailers that add a website as a
new distribution channel for an existing retail operation are likely to view
the site as an adjunct to their existing operations.  Bricks-and-mortar
firms might see no reason why they should seek more robust assent to
contracts online than they typically do in their existing stores.  If so, these
firms might systematically have less robust interfaces than virtual firms.
To illustrate that point, consider Table 7, which shows that assent is much
more common in wholly virtual firms than it is in firms that have adjunct
retail operations.79
Finally, as additional controls we included variables to account for
the competitive structure of the industry and for the product line.  Given
the discussion at the beginning of this Part, controls related to the prod-
uct lines are particularly important.  We started with some simple tabula-
tions of the level of assent for each of the fourteen product lines.  As
78. The science (or art, depending on your perspective) of designing retailer website
interfaces is a rapidly developing one.  To get a sense for the issues designers face, see, e.g.,
Rachelle Crum, ATG’s Cliff Conneighton:  E-Tailers “Can’t Wing It Anymore”, E-
Commerce Times, Feb. 21, 2007, at http://ecommercetimes.com/story/55847.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (interview with interface-design consultant who advises
retailers such as Best Buy, Target, Nike, Neiman Marcus, and OfficeMax).
79. Using a two-sample test of proportion, the difference is significant at the 1% level.
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TABLE 7:  MERCHANDISING CHANNELS AND ASSENT
Category Volume (B$) Number Percentage w/assent
Bricks and Mortar 48.2 275 2.9%
Virtual 20.8 225 8.9%
TOTAL 68.9 400 5.6%
Table 8 illustrates, the percentage of sites obtaining robust assent in par-
ticular markets differed widely from the 5.6% in the overall dataset.  The
boldface type indicates the two markets where the variation was signifi-
cant at the 5% level:  Both computers/electronics and food/drug had
unusually high levels of assent.  The italics indicate the three markets with
variations significant at the 10% level:  Books/CDs/DVDs and toys/hob-
bies had unusually high levels, while apparel/accessories had an unusu-
ally low level.80
TABLE 8:  MERCHANDISING MARKETS AND ASSENT
Market Volume (M$) Number Percentage w/assent
Mass Merchant/Dep’t Store 18,300 27 3.7%
Computers/Electronics 17,700 54 13.0%
Office Supplies 10,300 11 0%
Apparel/Accessories 7,060 109 1.8%
Books/CDs/DVDs 2,500 29 13.8%
Housewares/Furnishings 2,410 55 1.8%
Specialty/Non-Apparel 2,330 60 1.7%
Food/Drug 1,879 26 15.4%
Health/Beauty 1,750 17 5.9%
Sporting Goods 1,340 39 2.6%
Flowers/Gifts 1,200 18 5.6%
Hardware/Home Improvement 851 22 9.1%
Toys/Hobbies 741 19 15.8%
Jewelry 615 14 0%
TOTAL 68,900 500 5.6%
Some of these results are easy to understand.  For example, the dis-
cussion at the beginning of this Part supports the idea that electronics
retailers are leaders in obtaining assent.  Also, all of the food and drug
retailers seeking robust assent come within the subcategory of firms spe-
cializing in home delivery of groceries (PeaPod, FreshDirect, Safeway,
and Albertson’s).  Because customers at those retailers are likely to return
to the site frequently and spend a great deal of time there, we can specu-
late that the additional marginal cost of extracting robust assent is rela-
tively slight.  Conversely, most of the firms that sell books, toys, and ap-
parel are likely to be adjuncts of bricks-and-mortar firms that customarily
80. We tested the variations using a two-sample test of proportion and determined
significance based on the z statistic from that test.
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have sold products without obtaining formal contracts from their custom-
ers.  If the firms start from a baseline in which formal contracting has not
been necessary, they may see less reason to require formal contracts than
virtual firms that start without such experience.
To elucidate the effects of those variables, we estimated models in-
cluding not only the clauses variable discussed above, but also the busi-
ness variables and the controls discussed in this section.  To account for
the possibility that some of the variables might have direct and indirect
effects mediated by the Pro-Seller Clauses? variable, we separately esti-
mated models with Pro-Seller Clauses? as the dependent variable and
AssentLevel as the dependent variable.  The only variable that had a sub-
stantial indirect effect was the number of different products sold by the
retailer (Total SKUs).  To facilitate exploration of that variable, Model 2
of Table A1 adds that variable to the model separately.  Because the data
for that variable is highly skewed, our analysis uses a log-transformed ver-
sion of the variable.  The model suggests that the effect of Total SKUs is
largely indirect.  Specifically, Model 2 shows a small and statistically insig-
nificant coefficient on Log Total SKUs.  The effect of Log Total SKUs on
Pro-Seller Clauses?, however, is substantial.  A separate regression on that
question shows a relation significant at the .01% level.  Interestingly, the
addition of Log Total SKUs to the model increases the coefficient of
Pro-Seller Clauses? to .66, suggesting that once we account for breadth of
product line, firms with pro-seller clauses are likely to have an interface
that is two-thirds of a step more robust than firms without pro-seller
clauses.
Model 3 adds the controls discussed above.  The model summarized
here uses dummies for the two product lines that differ significantly from
the mean (computers/electronics and toys/hobbies) and uses HHI to
control for concentration in the industry.  Both of the industry controls
have substantial positive coefficients, suggesting that firms in those indus-
tries are likely to have more robust interfaces than firms in other indus-
tries.  Conversely, the absence of a significant coefficient on the HHI vari-
able, which controls for concentration in the industry, suggests that
market structure is not important in predicting the robustness of inter-
faces in this dataset.81  The addition of the controls increases the adjusted
R-squared of the model to 8.4%, but does not substantially decrease the
coefficient on the clauses variable (.602), which continues to suggest that
firms with pro-seller clauses will have an interface about one-half step
more robust than firms without pro-seller clauses.
Model 4 adds the additional independent variables for average
ticket, merchandising channel, and conversion rate.  In the final model
log, average ticket and conversion rate are statistically significant, but the
coefficient on pro-seller clauses remains about the same.  This suggests
81. We estimated a parallel set of models using CR4 without substantially different
results with respect to our principal hypotheses.
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that the addition of these variables improves the explanatory power of the
model (the adjusted R-squared in the final model is about 14%) without
diluting the importance of pro-seller clauses.  In the final model, the co-
efficient on Pro-Seller Clauses (.538) suggests that firms with those
clauses have interfaces about one-half step more robust than firms with-
out those clauses.  Consistent with the discussion above, both of the in-
dustry controls have positive coefficients.  Controlling for the other vari-
ables in the model, firms in the electronics industry have interfaces about
one-eighth of a step (.128) more robust, while firms in the food and drug
industry have interfaces almost an entire step (.869) more robust.  The
coefficient on the HHI variable remains small and statistically insignifi-
cant, as does the coefficient on the log of Total SKUs.
Finally, the model produces substantively significant coefficients for
each of the three final variables, all of which control for various features
of the website (average ticket, merchandising channel, and conversion
rates).  First, the coefficient for Log Average Ticket, significant at the .1%
level, is .457.  This suggests that an increase in the average ticket of 1%
would increase the robustness of the interface by almost one-half step.
For the other two site-related variables, the analysis is more tentative, be-
cause the coefficients, although substantial, are not statistically signifi-
cant.  Thus, conversion rate bears a coefficient of .046, which suggests
that a one percent increase in conversion rate is associated with a one-
twentieth step increase in robustness of the interface.  To put this in the
context of this dataset, moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of  con-
version rate would be associated with an increase of the robustness of the
interface of about a tenth of a level (.09).82  Although the relation is sta-
tistically weak, the Virtual? variable (which distinguishes between busi-
nesses that do and do not have bricks-and-mortar counterparts) has a co-
efficient of .246, indicating that the interfaces of wholly virtual businesses
in this model are about one-quarter step more robust than the interfaces
of those that are not wholly virtual.  The last column of the table presents
beta coefficients that allow us to discern the relative importance, within
this dataset, of the variables.83  Generally, those coefficients suggest that
Log Average Ticket (.259), Pro-Seller Clauses? (.186), and Conversion
Rates (.124) are the most important explanatory variables, and that the
Food/Drug industry dummy (.129) is an important control.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The central purpose of this Essay is to dispose of some obvious mis-
conceptions about internet retailing.  This is a burgeoning area of com-
merce that promises to be the most rapidly growing type of retail distribu-
82. The 25th percentile firm has a conversion rate of 1.8% and the 75th percentile
firm has a conversion rate of 3.85%.  (3.85 – 1.8) (.046) = .0943.
83. Those coefficients show the number of standard deviations of change in the
dependent variable associated with a one standard deviation shift of the explanatory
variable.
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tion for years to come.  Yet despite the ready availability of standardized
information about contracts, far too little is understood about con-
tracting in the internet retail setting.  It seems that for the great majority
of internet retailers, the ease of the shopping experience is more impor-
tant than concerns about possible future liability.  Thus, few retailers—
only about 6% in our population—use contracting interfaces sufficiently
robust to make it reasonable to expect that their contracts are enforcea-
ble against their customers.  Even more surprisingly, the contracts found
on internet retailers’ websites contain the standard, pro-seller boilerplate
provisions—arbitration, disclaimers of consequential damages, and the
like—much less frequently than would be expected.  No such clauses ap-
pear in the contracts for more than half of the retailers that we studied.
We attribute the appearance of the clauses in almost half of the contracts
to the conflict between two motivations:  the desire to have terms that
appear to be benign and the desire to have terms (albeit not in a binding
form) to which consumers will accede in the event of a dispute.
More broadly, we hope to contribute to an understanding of the re-
lation between formal and informal modes of contract enforcement.  In
our view, the data we present here suggest that businesses often can suc-
ceed in altering the practical terms of their relations with customers with-
out obtaining enforceable contracts.  The apparent use of unenforceable
terms to guide customer behavior provides a provocative addition to the
debate about whether assent should be the focus of doctrinal rules on
contract formation.  Among other things, it suggests that doctrinal rules
that make pro-seller terms unenforceable will have considerably less im-
pact in the real interactions of customers and merchants than scholars
have surmised.  This finding is particularly striking because of the remote
interactions of the parties.  Although many of the customers are repeat
customers, there is by definition almost no opportunity online for the
kind of personal interaction that characterizes relational contracting as it
is commonly understood.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1:  FORCED ASSENT REGRESSIONS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. Beta Coeff. Beta Coeff. Beta Coeff. Beta
Pro-Seller Clauses? .528*** .194 .659*** .228 .602*** .208 .538*** .186
(.115) (.167) (.162) (.153)
Log Total SKUs .0190 .031 .0363 .060 .046 .075
(.0425) (.450) (.044)
Electronics .515* .125 .128 .0311
(.250) (.285)
Food/Drug 1.164 .172 .869 .129
(.703) (.612)
HHI .0001 .077 .0001 .063
(.0001) (.0001)




Conversion Rates .046 .124
(.039)
R2 .036 .056 .099 .166
N 500 311 311 307
* - .05 ** - .01 *** .001
The table shows coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
